Den EU-finanzierten DNS-Dienst #DNS4EU kann ich nicht empfehlen, weil Zugriffe protokolliert werden - bei "schädlichen Inhalten" sogar mitsamt IP-Adresse. https://www.techradar.com/vpn/vpn-privacy-security/the-eu-challenges-google-and-cloudflare-with-its-very-own-dns-resolver-that-can-filter-dangerous-traffic
Es gibt gute nichtstaatliche Alternativen: https://www.privacy-handbuch.de/handbuch_93d.htm
Update: Es scheint, die IP-Speicherung erfolgt im o.g. Fall für 24 Stunden, damit die Warnung vor den Inhalten nicht immer wieder angezeigt wird.
@echo_pbreyer @isotopp As I use this with the unfiltered resolver, my IP address falls under 2.2 (i) and thus isn’t stored. The exceptions described here are a perfect description of how they implemented the dilemma of dealing with a user intended override. Blowing that up to surveillance insinuations seems disingenuous to me.
@jwildeboer @isotopp Right you are, I got that wrong. But they could do better than storing plaintext IP addresses, no?
@echo_pbreyer Sure. They could/should store hashes only for this 24 hour window and maybe they do. It's hard to deduct the exact technical implementation from the T&Cs alone. Someone should ask them how this 24 hour window works and how privacy restrictions are implemented. I expect the data to be physically limited to the DNS resolver itself and not accessible directly from other machines/services. @isotopp
@jwildeboer that the logs are only on the resolver itself, is in any infrastructure not implemented like that. Usually you ha e a central log aggregation tool like Grafana Loki or the ELK stack.
However, given the rest of the amateur show, I doubt they have a central log aggregation infrastructure. @echo_pbreyer @isotopp
@hikhvar It's not about logs, it's about keeping IP addresses that have demanded an override for certain DNS blocks for 24 hours so they don't have to keep on telling the DNS resolver that they want to keep this override active.
And, FTR, I don't agree with you that this is an "amateur show".