From Bolsonaro To BRICS: What Trump’s Tariffs On Brazil Are Really About

From Bolsonaro To BRICS: What Trump’s Tariffs On Brazil Are Really About

By Uriel Araujo

Trump’s 50% tariff on Brazil, framed as support for Bolsonaro, may actually target Brazil’s deepening ties with China and the BRICS bloc. The move risks triggering a trade war, damaging US interests, and accelerating the decline of American influence in Latin America.

In July 2025, President Donald Trump slapped Brazil with an unprecedented 50% tariff on key imports. This move jolted global markets and raised eyebrows across Latin America. The official rationale points to Brazil’s judicial pursuit of former President Jair Bolsonaro, a Trump ally accused of orchestrating a coup plot against President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2023. But is this really about Bolsonaro’s plight, or is it rather a strike at Brazil’s deepening ties with China and the BRICS alliance?

The tariffs do seem to be less about any personal loyalty (with regards to Trump and Bolsonaro) and more about a neo-Monroe Doctrine aimed at curbing Brazil’s geopolitical ambitions — particularly its role in the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), led by Lula’s close ally, former President Dilma Rousseff. Be it as it may, the fallout, however, risks destabilizing both Brazil and the US itself, with ripple effects on global trade and regional stability.

Brazil’s political scene remains a powder keg, with a far-right faction emboldened by the more radical followers of Bolsonaro posing a tangible yet often exaggerated threat. For one thing, it is true that the November 2024 arrests of five military officers, including a retired brigadier general, for allegedly plotting (or discussing such scenario) to assassinate Lula, Vice President Geraldo Alckmin, and Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes, revealed a dangerous enough undercurrent.

These conspirators, linked to Bolsonaro, reportedly considered drastic measures to overturn Lula’s 2022 election victory, which Bolsonaro publicly questioned. Yet, one may recall that the January 8, 2023, storming of Brazil’s Congress by Bolsonaro supporters — mostly elderly pensioners engaging in vandalism rather than armed rebellion — suggests the broader movement simply lacks the muscle for a full-scale coup.

While Bolsonaro or his close aides may have contemplated such extraordinary measures to remain in power, no concrete orders were given, suggesting either indecision or strategic retreat. The far-right threat, while real, is often inflated to paint Bolsonaro’s base as a monolithic terrorist force, when many are simply radicalized citizens and angry pensioners venting frustration.

No wonder that Justice Alexandre de Moraes has become a lightning rod in this polarized drama. His role as both a target of the alleged coup and the judge overseeing its investigation does raise glaring ethical questions. Moraes’ track record includes banning X (formerly Twitter) in Brazil amid a feud with Elon Musk, convicting January 8 protesters as “terrorists” under a controversial new definition, and barring Bolsonaro from running for office until 2030 for minor charges, as well as many other controversial measures.

This suggests a quasi-dictatorial overreach. His heavy-handed tactics, such as authorizing arrests in cases where he was a potential victim himself, trigger perceptions of a “judicial dictatorship”, thereby fuelling the very far-right radicalism he aims to suppress. This cycle of repression and reaction threatens Brazil’s fragile democratic cycle, barely four decades old.

In any case, as I noted in September 2024, Moraes’ feud with Musk already strained US-Brazil relations, given Washington’s deference to Big Tech oligarchs such as Musk himself (even to this day). Trump’s tariffs, by all indications, are less about Moraes’ excesses and more about geopolitical games.

One may recall that the US, under former President Joe Biden, played a pivotal role in ensuring Lula took office without major trouble, following the January 8 unrest, with diplomatic pressure and intelligence cooperation discouraging any escalation. This, predictably, fuels Bolsonaro’s supporters’ perceptions that Lula somehow “stole” the election. Now, with Trump back in power, the pendulum swings toward Bolsonaro, whose family enjoys a personal rapport with the former president.

But the tariffs, announced in July 2025, are no mere favour to an ally. Neither do they reflect a deep concern about Brazil’s complex democracy. As I argued in May 2025, Trump’s neo-Monroe Doctrine targets Latin American nations pivoting toward China, with Brazil’s leadership in the BRICS NDB — a quiet challenge to US financial hegemony — being a prime irritant. In 2024 alone, Brazil exported over over 90 billion worth of goods to China — far more than to the US — and posted a substantial trade surplus with China, of roughly $30–31 billion.

Trump’s tariffs, thus, are arguably a classic “madman” tactic. The American leader often employs bluff and bullying to extract concessions, as I’ve noted regarding his broader war against the so-called “deep state”. By targeting Brazil’s agriculture and steel sectors, Trump aims to pressure Lula into distancing from BRICS and China. Yet, Lula, a seasoned political survivor, shows no willingness to bend in this high-stakes game of “saving face”, thus far refusing to compromise with regards to BRICS alignment or de-dollarization.

The same can be said of Justice Moraes: Bolsonaro’s conviction, if anything, now seems even more likely. Moreover, Brazil’s response — potential retaliatory tariffs on US goods like machinery, fertilizers, and pharmaceuticals — could in fact escalate into a broader trade war. This standoff, in a way, echoes Trump’s missteps with Mexico, where similar tariff threats sparked regional backlash.

US tariffs in addition have actually hurt the Bolsonaro’s family, who are now being accused of “treasonous” behaviour for obvious reasons; and, in addition, such measures risk backfiring on the US itself: they push Brazil closer to China and BRICS, hurt US farmers and manufacturers, and may fuel an anti-US bloc in the Global South.

Although Trump is clearly over-politicizing the American trade policy with regards to Brazil, his stance is by no means set in stone. He has in fact reversed course just recently — by easing restrictions on Chevron in Venezuela only a few months after implementing them — so a pragmatic shift remains quite possible.

To sum up, Trump’s tariffs are a power play aimed at “bullying” Brazil using Bolsonaro as a proxy and Moraes’ judicial overreach as pretext. Brazil’s status as the largest Latin American economy, its expanding ties with China, and its leadership in the BRICS Bank have placed it in the crosshairs of Trump’s neo-Monroeist doctrine. Yet this manoeuvre risks domestic blowback, alienation abroad, and the erosion of US influence in its own “backyard”.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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