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Our exit relays are down, we suspect some manner of remote attack. The hardware itself appears offline.

Due to our co-location’s key card access changes, we are not able to get in to perform resets. Working on regaining access to our colo. We’d have remote hands reset them, but we’d like to assess the state and any possible kernel logs.

Our bridge relays are unaffected, they are on different hardware. The attacker’s appear to have been targeting exit relays.

Since we do not log network data, we cannot perform investigations into the attacker.

all 40 of our exit relays are back online this evening. we visited the datacenter and found the servers completely frozen.

on a positive note, all three of our Epyc HPEs have been upgraded to 128GB of RAM!

we'll be bumping up each server's relay count to 30 soon (currently 20 each). one of them has been out of service for a while, we'll be getting it back up with relays too, for a total of 90 exit relays.


@EmeraldOnion we experienced an attack on our exit relays in the past few days. Our hardware isn’t offline though. It was a large 40Gb/s flood that seemed to utilize the relays themselves.

@EmeraldOnion to be more clear, the malicious users were likely making requests that then returned large amounts of data. No proof either way though. Could have also been a reflection attack.

Infosec ExchangeRené Mayrhofer :verified: 🇺🇦 🇹🇼 (@rene_mobile@infosec.exchange)I have a brief story to tell: Earlier this week, a large DDoS attack against 2 out of our larger set of #Tor (@torproject@mastodon.social) relays - which also act as stable HSDir nodes - has managed to partially interrupt Internet traffic for the whole #JKULinz. While the attack was not huge compared to others (peak traffic around 3-4 Gbit/s, well above 1M PPS), we suspect either a nation state actor or fairly well-funded organization for 3 reasons: * The attack was more advanced than simply saturating the upstream with bandwidth/packets, but had proper handshakes with the Tor relays, trying to cause resource exhaustion on the application level (we have seen this pattern multiple times in the last 6+ months, but this one was much more massive in terms of incoming packets). * The attack was very targeted, affecting only 2 IPs out of 25, consistently over some time. This indicates that either the position in the HSDir or specific connections or hidden services that were relayed over those nodes were the target - but note that these are only guesses, we don't have hard data on the motivation of this targeting. * The only motivations that come to mind are either de-anonymization attacks or take-downs of particular hidden services. These do not seem to be relevant for usual ransom DDoS botnet attackers, but more for political reasons. We have some flow data and would be interested in doing more analysis. Any ideas or correlation with other data on Tor relay attacks welcome :) CC @GossiTheDog@cyberplace.social